Este ar tícu lo dis cu te va rios mo dos po si bles de com pren der el ca rác ter de los sis te mas ju rí di cos de la Unión Eu ro pea y sus re la cio nes. En par ti cular, se plan tea la cues tión de si exis te un sis te ma ju rí di co en la Unión Eu ro pea adi cio nal y dis tin to del sis te ma ju rí di co na cio nal de los Esta dos miem bros; o si es me jor con ce bir el de re cho de la Unión Eu ro pea sim plemen te como un as pec to de los sis te mas ju rí di cos de los Esta dos miembros; o bien, si es que de be ría mos pen sar que no hay sino sólo un sis tema ju rí di co en la Unión Eu ro pea con res pec to del cual los "sis te mas ju rí di cos na cio na les" de los Esta dos miem bros son en cier ta for ma subsis te mas. 
cu lar, I con si der whet her the re is an EU le gal system dis tinct from and in ad di tion to the na tio nal le gal systems of EU Mem ber Sta tes, or whet her it is bet ter to con cei ve of EU law me rely as an as pect of Mem ber Sta tes' le gal
systems, or in deed whet her we should think of the re being but a sin gle EU le gal system of which Mem ber Sta tes' "na tio nal le gal systems" are in some sen se sub-systems.
INTRODUCTION
How many le gal sys tems are there in the Eu ro pean Un ion? In ter preted as a ques tion about the le gal sys tems of the Union's con stit u ent Mem ber States at a given mo ment in time, this may seem like an easy ques tion: Oc to ber 2007, twentyseven Mem ber States, twenty-seven le gal sys tems. Even inter preted this way, how ever, this ap par ent sim plic ity evap orates on closer in spec tion, for there are Mem ber States which ap pear to be multi-le gal sys tem states, such as the United King dom, which ar gu ably brings to EU mem ber ship not one le gal sys tem but three. 1 In the pres ent ar ti cle, however, I am con cerned not merely with the le gal sys tems of each of the EU's Mem ber States, but also with the ex is tence and char ac ter of the EU le gal sys tem it self, and with its rela tions with the le gal sys tems of Mem ber States. Does there ex ist a Eu ro pean Un ion le gal sys tem, which can be un derstood as in some sense dis tinct from and in ad di tion to those le gal sys tems of the EU's con stit u ent Mem ber States, and with a sep a rate re la tion ship with each of those Mem ber State le gal sys tems? (We might call this the "Dis tinct EU legal sys tem" model or, ig nor ing the pos si bil ity of multi-le gal sys tem Mem ber States for the sake of sim pli fi ca tion of termi nol ogy, the "27 plus 1" model). Is EU law merely to be un der stood as an as pect of each of the le gal sys tems of the Mem ber States (for ex am ple, to the ex tent that its norms are en force able in Mem ber States' courts), and not as a distinct en tity in ad di tion to those do mes tic le gal sys tems? (We   11   HOW MANY LEGAL SYSTEMS? might term this the "Part of Mem ber States' Le gal Sys tems" model). Or, more rad i cally (at least in terms of prac ti cal poli tics and the pop u lar me dia in some Mem ber States), with re gard to ar eas fall ing within the com pe tence of the Eu ropean Un ion, is there only one EU le gal sys tem, of which the con stit u ent Mem ber States' le gal sys tems are to be un derstood as (in some sense) sub or di nate sub-sys tems? 2 (The "One Big Le gal Sys tem" model). Even this in tro duc tory attempt to pose these ques tions is be set with am bi gu ities and raises yet more ques tions at ev ery turn as re gards the possi ble re la tions be tween EU law and na tional law. 3 More over, the pres ent ar ti cle does not at tempt to set tle these is sues con clu sively. Rather, my aim is a more pre lim i nary one: that of at tempt ing to bring the rel e vant ques tions more clearly into fo cus, and to ex plore some con sid er ations stemming both from gen eral ju ris pru den tial un der stand ings of the na ture of law and le gal sys tems, and from par tic u lar exam ples of EU le gal doc trine, which in my view are rel e vant to build ing a sound un der stand ing of the char ac ter of and re la tions be tween le gal sys tems in the Eu ro pean Un ion. 4 12 JULIE DICKSON 2 In the pres ent ar ti cle I use the terms "EU law" and "EU le gal sys tem" in a broad non-tech ni cal sense, i. e. not to de note those dis tinc tions which re main between the so-called three pil lars of the EU. In fact, how ever, the par tic u lar ex amples of EU le gal doc trine I dis cuss are drawn from the Com mu nity "pil lar", and are hence in stances of Eu ro pean Com mu nity law (to the ex tent that three dis tinct pillars and con com i tant bod ies of law can still be iden ti fied). This be ing so, de pend ing on the con text, I some times re fer to "EC law" and to "EC rights" when dis cuss ing par tic u lar ex am ples. Al though I do not fo cus in this ar ti cle on the re main ing dif ferences be tween the pil lars in terms of the re la tions be tween the EU le gal sys tem(s?) and Mem ber State le gal sys tems, as will emerge dur ing the course of the dis cussion, I sus pect that there can not be a one-size-fits-all an swer to the ques tion of the re la tion ship be tween the EU le gal sys tem and na tional le gal sys tems be cause any such an swers are in part de pend ent on the dif fer en tial ex tent and man ner of enforceability in do mes tic courts of var i ous types of EU norms. 3 The pos si bil i ties can vassed above are not in tended to be ex haus tive, and also do not men tion, for ex am ple, the re la tion ship be tween EU law and in ter national law (or the re la tions be tween EU law, na tional law and in ter na tional law). My aim is rather to con vey a fla vour of the kinds of ques tions which have prompted my in ter est in this topic in terms of the pres ent ar ti cle.
Ex ten sive work on these and re lated is sues has, of course, been un der taken by Eu ro pean le gal schol ars, perhaps es pe cially in the con text of try ing to make sense of and draw con clu sions from the ri val claims to le gal supremacy made by the Eu ro pean Court of Jus tice, and some Member States' con sti tu tional courts re spec tively. 5 How ever, in com mon with Neil MacCormick and Mattias Kumm, I regard some of that work as in ad e quately theo rised. 6 This being so, what I hope is dis tinc tive about my ap proach in the pres ent ar ti cle is that it at tempts to ex am ine those is sues out lined above in light of some ju ris pru den tial work re garding the na ture of le gal sys tems, and that it takes the question of how to think about the le gal sys tems of the EU given the com plex in ter re la tions be tween EU norms and EU Mem ber States' na tional norms as its cen tral con cern.
A word on method: in pre vi ous work I ad vo cated a method olog i cal ap proach wherein law's es sen tial prop er ties can and should be iden ti fied and ex plained with out yet tak ing a stance on their moral or po lit i cal worth or justifiability, or on what we should do about law (e. g. obey, dis obey, attempt to dis man tle, or to re form it) given its na ture and the de mands it makes on us. 7 This meth od olog i cal ap proach 13 HOW MANY LEGAL SYSTEMS? lu mi nat ing ar ti cle, "Pre serv ing the Iden tity Cri sis: Au ton omy, Sys tem and Sov ereignty in Eu ro pean Law", 16 Law and Phi los o phy (1997), 377-420. Rich mond contends that there is a plu ral ity of dif fer ent ways of un der stand ing the re la tion ship be tween EU law, na tional law and in ter na tional law, and that the ap proach she adopts, "…makes no claim to be de rived from or to re flect ac tual prac tice or em pir ical 're al ity' in the Com mu nity" (op. cit. at 381), ap par ently on the grounds that, in such a young le gal sys tem, there is no set tled "in sti tu tional re al ity" (p382) to be cap tured ac cu rately.
5 I dis cuss this par tic u lar is sue, and the work of some com men ta tors on it, in sec tion 3 be low.
6 See N. MacCormick, "Ju rid i cal Plu ral ism and the Risk of Con sti tu tional Con flict", in MacCormick, N., Ques tion ing Sov er eignty (Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1999), ch. 7, es pe cially at 102 and 105; Kumm, M., "The Ju ris pru dence of Con stitu tional Con flict: Con sti tu tional Su prem acy in Eu rope be fore and af ter the Consti tu tional Treaty", 11 Eu ro pean Law Jour nal (2005), 262-307, es pe cially at 267-8 and 306.
informs the pres ent study as well: my pri mary aim is to work to wards a better un der stand ing of the char ac ter of and re la tions be tween le gal sys tems in the EU, not to explore the moral or po lit i cal le git i macy of those re la tions, nor to at tempt to pro vide guid ance to the Eu ro pean Court of Jus tice or Mem ber States' courts as to what they should do when faced with adjudicative di lem mas re sult ing from, for ex am ple, ri val su prem acy claims or other con flicts of norms be tween EU le gal sys tems. Some EU con sti tu tional schol ars ap pear to criti cise such an ex plan a tory ap proach for its "nor ma tive in ert ness", 8 i. e. pre cisely be cause it will not tell judges what to do in re solv ing con flicts which may arise between, for ex am ple, a na tional con sti tu tional court and the ECJ. 9 This is true, but, in my view, not a cause for crit icism. The goal of at tempt ing to un der stand what some thing 9 This is my un der stand ing of Mattias Kumm's views on the in ad e quacy of under stand ing ri val su prem acy claims of the EU le gal or der and Mem ber States le gal or ders in terms of a con flict be tween two dis tinct ul ti mate le gal rules de ter min ing what is to count as law (e. g. Hartian rules of rec og ni tion) in Kumm, M., "The Ju rispru dence of Con sti tu tional Con flict: Con sti tu tional Su prem acy in Eu rope be fore and af ter the Con sti tu tional Treaty", n. above, es pe cially sec tion II. How ever, Kumm's meth od olog i cal stance in this ar ti cle is in fact not en tirely clear. He be gins the ar ti cle (p. 266) by dis tin guish ing be tween de scrip tive, ex plan a tory and nor mative ac counts of the re la tion ship be tween EU law and na tional law. At this stage, he ap pears to re gard the for mer two ap proaches as valu able in their own right, al beit dis tinct from the third ap proach, which he wishes to pur sue him self and which he char ac ter ises as ex plor ing, "the nor ma tive ques tion what na tional courts should be do ing…" (p. 266). How ever, he then criticises (sec tion II, es pe cially 273-4) at tempts to un der stand the ri val su prem acy claims of the EU and na tional le gal or ders in terms of a con flict be tween ul ti mate le gal rules on the ba sis that such ac counts explain such ri val claims in terms of the ex is tence of two in com pat i ble ul ti mate le gal rules -of the EU le gal or der, and of a given na tional le gal or der-and are then com mit ted to the view that le gally speak ing there is no way to re solve the con flict, and so do not pro vide le gal or other guid ance as to what a court faced with two incom pat i ble such rules should ac tu ally do in a case be fore it. This, how ever, appears to criti cise an ex plan a tory ac count of the na ture of ul ti mate le gal rules and their role in le gal sys tems in iden ti fy ing what is to count as law, for fail ing to answer the nor ma tive ques tion of what a judge ought to do if faced with two con flicting such rules. This lat ter ques tion, how ever, is not a ques tion which an ac count of the na ture and role of ul ti mate le gal rules (such as Hart's or Kelsen's, both of whom Kumm men tions in his ar ti cle) were in tended to an swer. All of this seems to sit awk wardly with Kumm's ear lier ac knowl edge ment of the dis tinct ness and value of de scrip tive and ex plan a tory ac counts of le gal phe nom ena.
is like for its own sake, surely on any view a cen trally impor tant aim of ac a demic ac tiv ity, seems to me to have been im prop erly de moted by some le gal the o rists, on the ground that only ac counts of law which tell us which jus ti fy ing values un der lie it and hence which course of ac tion is mandated in light of it are suf fi ciently "in ter est ing" to be the proper prov ince of ju ris pru den tial theo ris ing. 10 I re gard legal the ory as a broader church than this, and one in which we should not apo lo gise for hav ing the aim of deepen ing our un der stand ing of some as pect of law rather than work ing out what a judge or court or cit i zen ought to do. Achiev ing an ac cu rate un der stand ing of the char ac ter and com plex ity of re la tions be tween le gal sys tems in the EU seems an in ter est ing and im por tant task es pe cially given the rel e vance of the EU and other in ter na tional or gani sations in con tem po rary so cial and le gal life. Such an un derstand ing may of course be an im por tant pre cur sor to a consid er ation of the pres ent and po ten tial fu ture po lit i cal le git i macy of the EU, and may point the way to wards the proper way to re solve adjudicative and other con flicts arising in the EU le gal sys tems (both ex tremely im por tant and worth while the o ret i cal pro jects) but on the meth od olog i cal ap proach adopted here, the chances of mov ing for ward with such pro jects in a sound way will be en hanced by at tempting first of all to un der stand the char ac ter of the EU, and the re la tions be tween its le gal sys tems.
All this said, how ever, it is also my view in the pres ent ar ti cle that some is sues re gard ing the lim its of and re lations be tween the EU le gal sys tem and Mem ber States le gal sys tems can only be ap proached by con sid er ing the par ticu lar char ac ter of the EU and the po lit i cal con text in which it ex ists, and the par tic u lar le gal and con sti tu tional doctrines de vel oped within it over the last fifty years. In the con text of the EU, some ques tions re gard ing the iden tity con di tions of le gal sys tems, and, in par tic u lar, whether a given set of norms are best thought of as be long ing to one le gal sys tem or an other may not be an swer able purely by ref er ence to ab stract the o ret i cal con sid er ations re gard ing the na ture of le gal sys tems and their cri te ria of sys tem mem ber ship. This be ing so, the gen eral meth od olog i cal approach out lined above may need to be tem pered some what in or der to im prove our un der stand ing of the re la tions between le gal sys tems in the par tic u lar con text of the Eu ropean Un ion. This point should be come clearer as the ar ti cle pro gresses and as I start to con sider what sort of investigations might be necessary in order to develop a fuller understanding of the issues outlined above.
IS THERE AN EU LEGAL SYSTEM?
What ev i dence is there for the ex is tence of an EU le gal sys tem which is dis tinct from the le gal sys tems of the EU's con stit u ent Mem ber States, with its own cri te ria of sys tem mem ber ship de ter min ing which laws are part of that system, and the man ner and ex tent of their enforceability? On the face of it, plenty. First of all, we have the many pronounce ments of the Eu ro pean Court of Jus tice on the matter -so fa mil iar as to now seem com mon place-in a sem inal line of cases spell ing out its view of the char ac ter of the EU le gal or der and its re la tion ship with Mem ber States' legal orders and Member States' nationals: …the com mu nity con sti tutes a new le gal or der of in ter national law… 11 By con trast with or di nary in ter na tional trea ties, the EEC treaty has cre ated its own le gal sys tem… 12 16 …the law stem ming from the treaty, an in de pend ent source of law… 13 The trans fer by the states from their do mes tic le gal sys tem to the com mu nity le gal sys tem of the rights and ob li ga tions aris ing un der the Treaty… 14 It should be borne in mind at the out set that the EEC Treaty has cre ated its own le gal sys tem… 15 The EU is also en dowed with its own sources of law, 16 law-mak ing in sti tu tions and pro ce dures, 17 meth ods of polic ing Mem ber States' com pli ance with EU ob li ga tions, 18 pro ce dures for the ju di cial re view of EU norms, 19 and, largely thanks to the re nowned ju di cial ac tiv ism of the ECJ, its own dis tinc tive take on doc trines re gard ing the direct enforceability of EC law by in di vid u als in Mem ber States' courts, 20 and its pri macy over na tional law in cases of con flict. 21 Per haps the doc trine of the pri macy or su- 16 In the form of the con sti tu tive Trea ties of the EU, as amended, sec ond ary legis la tion cre ated and agree ments made there un der, re cog nised gen eral prin ci ples of law in clud ing fun da men tal rights, and ju di cial de ci sions of the Eu ro pean Court of Jus tice and Court of First In stance (al though there is for mal sys tem of pre ce dent in re spect of these lat ter). 17 Arts. 189-267, Treaty Es tab lish ing the Eu ro pean Com mu nity (here in af ter EC Treaty). 18 Arts. 226-8 EC Treaty, and also the "in di vid ual en force ment" meth ods un der the di rect ef fect, in di rect ef fect, in ci den tal or exclusionary ef fect, fun da men tal rights, and Mem ber State li a bil ity lines of case law, dis cussed fur ther in the remain der of this ar ti cle. 19 Arts. [1978] premacy of EC law is of par tic u lar sig nif i cance in this regard, which the Court of Jus tice seems to view as de riv ing in part from the ex is tence and char ac ter of the EU le gal sys tem as a dis tinct le gal sys tem: …the law stem ming from the treaty, an in de pend ent source of law, could not, be cause of its spe cial and orig i nal na ture, be over rid den by do mes tic le gal pro vi sions, how ever framed, with out be ing de prived of its char ac ter as com mu nity law and with out the le gal ba sis of the com mu nity it self be ing called into ques tion. 22 The trans fer by the states from their do mes tic le gal sys tem to the com mu nity le gal sys tem of the rights and ob li ga tions aris ing un der the treaty car ries with it a per ma nent lim i tation of their sov er eign rights, against which a sub se quent uni lat eral act in com pat i ble with the con cept of the com munity can not pre vail… 23 This view chimes well with cer tain ju ris pru den tial un derstand ings of the na ture of le gal sys tems. There are le gal the o rists from across the ju ris pru den tial spec trum who con tend that a su prem acy claim -un der stood as in clud ing a claimed au thor ity to reg u late the op er a tion of other norma tive sys tems ap ply ing to the same sub ject-com mu nity, and the in abil ity to ac cept any claim to su prem acy over the same com mu nity made by an other le gal sys tem-is a neces sary fea ture of le gal sys tems. 24 It is per haps use ful to say a word here on the use made in this ar ti cle of other le gal the o rist's views on the na ture of le gal sys tems. In the pres ent dis cus sion I do not at tempt con clu sively to both of these claims in its op er a tion of the doc trine of the su prem acy of EC law, in claim ing au thor ity to reg u late the op er a tion of Mem ber States le gal sys tems in so far as they con flict with en force able EC norms, and in re sist ing claims by some na tional con sti tu tional courts that ul ti mate author ity to de cide the op er a tion of na tional le gal norms vis-à-vis EC le gal norms rests with them. 25 These doc trines of the pri macy and di rect ef fect of EC law 26 may seem to take us be yond con sid er ations speak ing to the ex is tence of a dis tinct EU le gal sys tem into mat ters re gard ing the char ac ter of its re la tion ship with Mem ber States' le gal sys tems, but they surely also pro vide ev i dence of the ex is tence and dis tinc tive char ac ter of the EU le gal sys tem in the sense of that sys tem pos sess ing its own view on, and cri te ria as re gards, the force and ef fect of its norms. More over, its cre ation and de vel op ment of the doctrines of the di rect ef fect and pri macy of EC law tes tify not
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es tab lish the truth or fal sity of those le gal the o ret i cal views in their en tirety. Rather, for the most part, I am us ing as pects of them as an an a lyt i cal tool to open up some is sues re gard ing the char ac ter of and re la tions be tween le gal sys tems in the EU, and to as sist me in de vel op ing my own views re gard ing those is sues. The ex tent to which I am in agree ment with cer tain of the views of other le gal the o rists should be ap par ent from the con text, and from my own ar gu ments for or against par tic u lar ways of con cep tual is ing the char ac ter of the EU le gal sys tem and its rela tions with Mem ber States' le gal sys tems. As the dis cus sion de vel ops, I give partic u lar con sid er ation to as pects of Jo seph Raz's views for the rea son that Raz is one of the few con tem po rary le gal phi los o phers who has writ ten ex ten sively on questions spe cif i cally per tain ing to the na ture of le gal sys tems. Such ques tions seem to have fallen out of ju ris pru den tial fash ion to a large ex tent: it is my hope that the need to prop erly un der stand as pects of the EU and other su pra-state and in ter national or ga ni za tions may en gen der re newed in ter est in them on the part of le gal the o rists.
25 See e. g. Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125. Of course, the ECJs usual mo dus ope randi as re gards this is sue is to try to avoid an out and out con fron ta tion. None the less, in cases where na tional courts seem on the verge of con tra ven ing the ECJs un der stand ing of the su prem acy doc trine, e.g. by pos si bly re view ing EC norms in light of na tional con sti tu tional norms, as in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft lit i ga tion, the ECJ re jects such pos si bil i ties and firmly re-states its un der stand ing of su prem acy, e.g. by mak ing it clear that the valid ity of EC norms can only be judged by ref er ence to EC law.merely to what the ECJ says re gard ing the ex is tence of an EU le gal sys tem but to what it has man aged to do, and to the so cial re al ity of the prac tices it has man aged to in stitute as re gards the op er a tion of EU law as a dis tinct body of law. In hav ing man aged to per suade Mem ber States' national courts, al beit some times sub ject to res er va tions from the point of view of those courts them selves, 27 to ap ply and en force di rectly ef fec tive EC law in na tional courts, and to ac cord it pri macy over na tional law in cases of con flict, 28 and hence al low in di vid u als ac cess to EC rights in de pendently of and some times in op po si tion to, na tional law, the ECJ has moved be yond talk ing the talk of the ex is tence and char ac ter of a dis tinct EU le gal sys tem to play ing a role in 29 al ter ing the prac tices of na tional courts in ac tu ally re cognis ing, ap ply ing, and grant ing pri macy to some of the norms of that le gal sys tem. 30 As will be dis cussed fur ther in sec tion 4 be low, how ever, all of this may raise yet more ques tions re gard ing the sta tus of EU norms which are directly en force able in na tional courts: do they re main primar ily norms of the EU le gal sys tem but which, for var i ous rea sons, hap pen to be granted do mes tic enforceability, or do they ac tu ally be come part of the do mes tic legal system of a given Member State, such that they are fully part of 20 JULIE DICKSON 27 This is dis cussed fur ther in sec tion 3. 28 And, more re cently, hav ing backed up na tional courts' ob li ga tions to en sure that in di vid u als have proper ac cess to their EC rights by means of the threat ened im po si tion of Mem ber State li a bil ity in re spect of courts of last in stance com mit ting suf fi ciently se ri ous breaches of EC law es tab lished in Case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239. 29 I put things this way be cause, as is of ten and rightly stressed by com men tators in this area, the re la tion ship be tween the ECJ and na tional courts, es pe cially in terms of mak ing, re ceiv ing, and cor rectly ap ply ing Art. national law to the extent that national courts have a duty to apply them (or both?)?
All these fac tors seem to amount to a strong case for under stand ing the EU le gal or der as a dis tinct le gal sys tem which ex ists in ad di tion to the le gal sys tems of its con stit uent Mem ber States, and with its own cri te ria de ter min ing which norms be long to that sys tem, the man ner and ex tent of their enforceability, and the re la tions be tween its own norms and norms of na tional law with which it in ter acts in Mem ber States' courts. 31 In other words, to use the shorthand ter mi nol ogy coined in the in tro duc tion to this ar ti cle, the "27 plus 1" model would seem to have con sid er able sup port. One al ter na tive view men tioned in the in tro duction to this ar ti cle, that of EU law as merely an as pect of each of the le gal sys tems of the Mem ber States, and not as a dis tinct en tity in ad di tion to those do mes tic le gal sys tems seems to hold lit tle plau si bil ity. 32 
THE RELEVANCE OF RIVAL SUPREMACY CLAIMS
If the EU le gal sys tem is a dis tinct le gal sys tem in its own right, ex ist ing in ad di tion to those le gal sys tems of the EU Mem ber States, what is the re la tion ship be tween the EU legal sys tem and those na tional sys tems of law? In ter preted in one way, this ques tion has a fa mil iar an swer: from the point of view of the EU le gal sys tem, cer tainly as ex pressed in judge ments of the Eu ro pean Court of Jus tice, EC law has pri macy or su prem acy over Mem ber States' na tional law, must pre vail over it in cases of con flict, and (un der certain con di tions 33 ) can be en forced di rectly by in di vid u als in na tional courts. 34 But if this is so, and if the doc trines of the di rect ef fect and su prem acy of EC law over na tional law an swer the ques tion of how to un der stand the re la tion ship be tween the EU le gal sys tem and Mem ber States' le gal systems then, as Neil MacCormick points out, per haps we have rea son to think in terms of there be ing just a sin gle EU le gal sys tem, with the le gal sys tems of its con stit u ent Mem ber States merely as sub-sys tems operating under the auspices of, and regulated by, that EU legal system:
Once we have es tab lished this doc trine of the su prem acy of Com mu nity law, how ever, the ques tion in ev i ta bly to be posed is whether there is any need at all for an elab o rate the ory about in ter ac tion of dis tinct sys tems. If sys tem X enjoys su prem acy over sys tem Y, why trou ble to have a the ory about sep a rate sys tems, rather than a the ory which acknowl edges the fact that Y be longs to X as sub-sys tem of it? 35 How ever, as MacCormick goes on to dis cuss in the remain der of this ar ti cle, and as is also taken up be low, there are none the less strong rea sons for re ject ing the "One Big Legal Sys tem" model, and they are to be found in the at ti tudes, pro nounce ments and prac tices of some Mem ber States' 22 JULIE DICKSON 33 For dis cus sion of those EC mea sures which are ca pa ble of di rect ef fect, and of the con di tions nec es sary for the doc trine's op er a tion, see e. g. Douglas-Scott, S., (Longman, 2002) , part II, chap ter 4; Arnull, A. et al., Wyatt and Dashwood's Eu ro pean Un ion Law, 5th. ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) , part 3, chap ter 5; Craig, P. and Burca, G. de, Eu ro pean Un ion Law, 3rd. ed., n. above, ch. 5. 34 The seem ingly now doomed, at least in its cur rent form, Con sti tu tional Treaty, also in cludes a pri macy clause in Part I, Ar ti cle I-6. 35 MacCormick, N., "Ju rid i cal Plu ral ism and the Risk of Con sti tu tional Conflict", n. above, 116. courts, par tic u larly con sti tu tional courts, as re gards their view of the re la tion ship be tween EC law and na tional law and their rea sons for ap ply ing EC norms in na tional courts. As prac ti cally ev ery text book and ac a demic com men ta tor on the sub ject points out, the is sue of the su prem acy of EC law is very much a two-sided coin: there is the view of the su prem acy of EC law from the point of view of the Eu ropean Court of Jus tice on the one hand, and then the dif feren tial re cep tions of that view by na tional courts in the Mem ber States on the other. 36 As has al ready been noted in sec tion 2 above, the ECJ's view is un equiv o cal: ow ing to the spe cial na ture and pur pose of the EC le gal or der, EC law has pri macy over na tional law in cases of con flict, 37 and this is so whether the na tional law in ques tion is prior or sub se quent to the EC mea sure, 38 even as re gards po ten tial clashes be tween EC norms and norms in na tional con sti tutions, 39 and even if this re quires sig nif i cant al ter ations in past na tional con sti tu tional prac tice as re gards, for ex ample, whether the ju di cial sus pen sion and disapplication of pri mary leg is la tion is le gally pos si ble in the ju ris dic tion in ques tion. 40 Mem ber States' courts, and es pe cially -where they ex ist-con sti tu tional courts, vary in their ap proach both as be tween Mem ber States and over time. In some juris dic tions the doc trine of the su prem acy of EC law over national law has, af ter trou bled be gin nings, 41 in the end been ac cepted by con sti tu tional courts, but sub ject to con di tions and lim i ta tions, such as the EC le gal sys tem con tin u ing to guar an tee an ad e quate level of pro tec tion of fun da men tal rights, 42 and re main ing within the proper sphere of its compe tences, 43 as is the case in the well doc u mented story of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) in its deal ings with the re la tion ship be tween EC law and Ger man law. 44 Even in the pres ent more co-op er a tive chap ter in this tale, the federal con sti tu tional court and the na tional con sti tu tional order more broadly has re served to it self the right to de termine whether the EU le gal sys tem is con tin u ing to ful fil the con di tions that the Ger man con sti tu tional or der has imposed. 45 In the UK, af ter some years of es sen tially fudg ing the is sue, 46 na tional courts fi nally had to bite the bul let in the Factortame lit i ga tion and grant EC law su prem acy over con flict ing na tional law. Al though this in volved sig nif i cant changes in na tional ju di cial prac tice as re gards the abil ity of UK courts to sus pend and disapply pri mary leg is la tion, 47 the House of Lords in sisted that this is by rea son of and sub ject to the will of the West min ster Par lia ment via the Eu ro pean Com mu ni ties Act 1972. 48 The con sti tu tional courts of some Mem ber States which have re cently ac ceded to the EU have also sounded warn ing sig nals re gard ing the fact that they do not ac cept un equiv o cally the doc trine of the su prem acy of EC law in the terms ex pressed by the 24 ECJ. 49 What unites these re sponses is that in each case, the na tional le gal sys tem re serves to it self the right ul timately to de ter mine the re la tion ship be tween the EU le gal sys tem and the na tional le gal sys tem and to im pose con ditions on the op er a tion of that re la tion ship. Even as they grant EC law su prem acy over na tional law, then, they do so on a dif fer ent ba sis from that ex pounded by the ECJ: for the ECJ, the su prem acy of EC law over na tional law is a con se quence of the very na ture and pur pose of EC law and is hence re quired as a doc trine of EC law it self, 50 for many na tional le gal sys tems, EC law has in the end usu ally been granted su prem acy over na tional law al beit some times condi tion ally, but it has been granted this on the say so, and un der the terms set by, the na tional courts and the national con sti tu tional or der more broadly.
Con sti tu tional Law of the Eu ro pean Un ion
If le gal the o rists such as Raz are cor rect that a su premacy claim -in clud ing a claimed au thor ity to reg u late the op er a tion of other nor ma tive sys tems ap ply ing to the same sub ject-com mu nity, and the in abil ity to ac cept any claim to su prem acy over the same com mu nity made by an other legal sys tem-is a nec es sary fea ture of le gal sys tems, then this fa mil iar story re. the at ti tudes of EU Mem ber States' courts should come as no sur prise. 51 Or, to put things another way, on this view of the na ture of le gal sys tems, the prac tices of na tional courts seem to pro vide ev i dence that Mem ber States' le gal sys tems re main just that, dis tinct legal sys tems which re serve to them selves the right to de termine the op er a tion of other nor ma tive sys tems such as the EU le gal sys tem and the re la tion ship be tween that le gal sys tem and do mes tic law. It is im por tant to note that on 51 See those works cited in n. above.
this un der stand ing, a su prem acy claim by a le gal sys tem need not come in the form: "my norms trump your norms in all cir cum stances". Rather, as Raz points out, such a claim can in clude a per mis sion to an other nor ma tive system to op er ate within the ju ris dic tion of the le gal sys tem in ques tion, 52 and in my view there seems no rea son why this could not in clude a per mis sion for its norms to pre vail over that le gal sys tem's norms. So long as the per mis sion for another nor ma tive sys tem to op er ate thus is within the grant of the le gal sys tem mak ing the su prem acy claim, it re mains a su prem acy claim, and re mains a dis tinct le gal sys tem.
The at ti tude of the House of Lords in the UK and Bundesverfassungssgericht in Ger many can plau si bly be un der stood in this way: each is grant ing a per mis sion for the norms of an other nor ma tive sys tem, the EU le gal system, to op er ate in the do mes tic sys tem, and to pre vail over do mes tic le gal norms in cases of con flict, but each is do ing so on the terms set by, and be cause of a per mis sion granted by, the do mes tic le gal sys tem. More over, nei ther is ac cept ing un equiv o cally the char ac ter and ba sis of the claim to su prem acy made by the Eu ro pean Court of Jus tice on its own terms. All of this seems to ev i dence the con tinued ex is tence of those Mem ber States' le gal sys tems as distinct sys tems, with dis tinct su prem acy claims (al beit suprem acy claims in clud ing per mis sions to an other nor ma tive sys tem to op er ate within their ju ris dic tions, and for the norms of that sys tem to pre vail over na tional norms in cases of con flict), rather than as mere sub-sys tems of a single EU le gal sys tem. 53 26 JULIE DICKSON 52 Raz, The Au thor ity of Law, n. above, 118. 53 In the lit er a ture on this topic there is usu ally much fo cus on the more "re sistant" Mem ber States, but even in those states whose na tional con sti tu tional arrange ments are ex tremely open to the re cep tion of EC law and to the doc trine of its su prem acy over con flict ing na tional law, it can still be ar gued that it re mains the na tional le gal sys tem which is call ing the shots. For ex am ple, in the Dutch le gal sys tem, wherein in ter na tional trea ties, upon ap proval by the Dutch Par lia ment (Neth er lands Con sti tu tion, Art. 91), be come bind ing do mes ti cally (ibi dem Art. 93), have pre ce dence over con flict ing na tional law (ibi dem, Art. 94), and can not be reviewed by the courts on grounds of their con sti tu tion al ity (ibi dem, Art. 120), all of Two ques tions seem to trou ble com men ta tors writ ing on this is sue: how to con cep tu al ize the sit u a tion given these dif fer ent un der stand ings on the part of the ECJ and of some na tional courts re spec tively of who has the ul ti mate au thor ity to de ter mine the re la tion ship be tween EC law and na tional law, and what we should do about it (and in deed whether we should do any thing about it), per haps es pecially in light of a po ten tial or ac tual con flict be tween the ECJ and a na tional con sti tu tional court over which norms to ap ply in a given case. On the is sue of how to con cep tu alize the sit u a tion, "plu ral ism" seems to be the or der of the day, at least in terms of ac a demic pop u lar ity. This means many things to many com men ta tors, 54 but Neil MacCormick's view captures the central idea:
So re la tions be tween states inter se and be tween states and the Com mu nity are in ter ac tive rather than hi er ar chi cal. The le gal sys tems of mem ber-states and their com mon le gal sys -
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this is still so be cause of the terms of the Neth er lands con sti tu tion, i.e. on the say-so of the Dutch le gal sys tem. How ever, the sit u a tion in the Neth er lands may be more com plex than this, be cause, as Bruno de Witte notes in his in for ma tive ar ti cle on the topic -Witte, B. de, "Do Not Men tion the Word: Sov er eignty in Two Europhile Coun tries: Bel gium and the Neth er lands", in Walker, N. (ed.), Sov er eignty in Tran sition, n. above, 351-366, at 362-3 -some con sti tu tional schol ars in the Neth er lands go still fur ther than this and claim that EC law ap plies and has su prem acy in the Dutch le gal sys tem not be cause of the op er a tion of those ar ti cles of the Neth erlands Con sti tu tion re ferred to above, but on its (i. e. the EC le gal sys tem's) own author ity. In my view, one can still ar gue that if this is the at ti tude of the Dutch courts and Dutch le gal sys tem more broadly, then it is still their at ti tude, and hence the Dutch courts' view ing EC law in this way and al low ing it to op er ate in this way is still hap pen ing on their say-so and can still be in ter preted as a per mission to an other nor ma tive sys tem to op er ate within the Neth er lands granted by the or gans of the Dutch le gal sys tem in vir tue of their view of the sta tus of cer tain in terna tional le gal or ders vis-à-vis the Dutch le gal sys tem. Re solv ing this is sue would re quire a foray into Dutch con sti tu tional the ory of a kind that can not be at tempted here. If I am wrong and the at ti tude of the Dutch courts can not be in ter preted as the Dutch le gal sys tem grant ing a per mis sion to the EU le gal sys tem to op er ate, then pos si bly the Dutch le gal sys tem makes no claim to su prem acy at all, and, on the Razian view at least, may be a bor der line case of a dis tinct le gal sys tem, at least in ar eas within the com pe tence of the EU. 54 And some times many things to the same com men ta tor, see e. g. Neil Walker's dis cus sion of the re la tions be tween "ex plan a tory plu ral ism", "nor ma tive plu ral ism" and "epistemic plu ral ism" in Walker, N., "The Idea of Con sti tu tional Plu ral ism", 65 Mod ern Law Re view (2002), 317-359, es pe cially at 336-339. tem of EC law are dis tinct but in ter act ing sys tems of law, and hi er ar chi cal re la tion ships of va lid ity within cri te ria of valid ity proper to dis tinct sys tems do not add up to any sort of all-pur pose su pe ri or ity of one sys tem over an other. It fol lows also that the in ter pre ta tive power of the high est de ci sionmak ing au thor i ties of the dif fer ent sys tems must be, as to each sys tem, ul ti mate. 55 One thing is clear from the ac a demic lit er a ture on this topic: there is a lot of plu ral ism about. As Nick Bar ber has noted, in the case of some such ac counts, this ap pears simply to mean that there are a lot of dis tinct le gal sys tems about in the Eu ro pean Un ion, 56 and, in the case of re lations be tween the EU le gal sys tem and var i ous Mem ber States le gal sys tems, that nei ther can be seen as mere subsys tems in re la tion to the other, nor as stand ing in a hi erar chi cal re la tion to the other. 57 As re gards what we ought to do as re gards the dif fer ent un der stand ings of the re la tion ship be tween EC law and national law held by the high est ju di cial or gans of the dis tinct sys tems, com men ta tors vary widely in their views. For some the sit u a tion amounts to a cri sis, to be re solved by tip ping the bal ance in fa vour of na tional le gal sys tems, and granting to na tional con sti tu tional courts the power to limit the 28 JULIE DICKSON 55 MacCormick, "Ju rid i cal Plu ral ism and the Risk of Con sti tu tional Con flict", n. above, at 118. For other plu ral ist views see those works re ferred to in notes and to be low. 56 Bar ber, N., "Le gal Plu ral ism and The Eu ro pean Un ion", 12 Eu ro pean Law Jour nal (2006), 306-329, at 325-6. Bar ber goes on to ques tion whether this is a plu ral ism suf fi ciently con tro ver sial to be wor thy of the name, and pos tu lates his own ver sion of plu ral ism in which a le gal sys tem qual i fies as plu ral ist if there are mul ti ple and in con sis tent rules of rec og ni tion within a given le gal sys tem. 57 As Walker puts it, us ing a for mu la tion which ech oes through the lit er a ture on this topic, "The re la tion ship be tween the or ders…is now hor i zon tal rather than ver ti cal -heterarchical rather than hi er ar chi cal", Walker, "The Idea of Con sti tutional Plu ral ism", n. above, at 337. For a rare non-plu ral ist read ing of the re la tionship be tween EC law and na tional law, see Weyland, I., "The Ap pli ca tion of Kelsen's The ory of the Le gal Sys tem to Eu ro pean Com mu nity Law: The Su prem acy Puz zle Re solved", 21 Law and Phi los o phy (2001), 1-37, es pe cially at 33. op er a tion of the doc trine of the su prem acy of the EC law. 58 Oth ers wel come the sit u a tion, for ex am ple, "…con tend ing that the only ac cept able ethic of po lit i cal re spon si bil ity for the new Eu rope is one that is pre mised upon mu tual rec ogni tion and re spect be tween na tional and su pra na tional author i ties". 59 Amongst the wel com ers, a pleth ora of ways forward are en vis aged un der a va ri ety of ti tles, in clud ing "late sov er eignty", 60 "contrapunctual law", 61 "constitutionalism be yond the state" 62 and "Eu ro pean in teg rity". 63 Still oth ers coun sel cau tion as re gards par tic u lar pos si ble ways forward such as whether spell ing out a de fin i tive state ment of the su prem acy prin ci ple in a Eu ro pean Con sti tu tion is a good course of ac tion. 64 As was dis cussed in the open ing sec tion, my aim in this ar ti cle is to work to wards a better un der stand ing of re lations be tween le gal sys tems in the EU, not to jus tify or decry or try to work out what we should do about those re lations once we have a better such un der stand ing. In the fore go ing dis cus sion, I have ar gued that there is am ple ev idence for not con ceiv ing of Mem ber States' le gal sys tems as sub-sys tems of a sin gle EU le gal sys tem, and for view ing those na tional le gal sys tems as still mak ing claims to suprem acy in clud ing the claimed au thor ity to reg u late the oper a tion of the norms of other nor ma tive sys tems, such as the EU le gal sys tem, in do mes tic courts. In sec tion 2 I also 29 sur veyed some ev i dence in fa vour of un der stand ing the EU le gal sys tem as a dis tinct le gal sys tem and not merely as an as pect of each of the Mem ber States' le gal sys tems. Many of the 'plu ral ist' read ings of the re la tions be tween the EU le gal or der and na tional le gal or ders also view re la tions be tween le gal sys tems of the EU as a se ries of in ter ac tions be tween dis tinct le gal sys tems with dis tinct loci of ul ti mate au thority. 65 All of this seems to point to a pic ture in which the answer to the ques tion, 'how many le gal sys tems are there in the EU?', is to be found in the "27 plus 1" model, i. e. that there are as many le gal sys tems as there are Mem ber States' le gal sys tems, plus one, the EU le gal sys tem, 66 which is a dis tinct le gal sys tem in its own right, and which has a re la tion ship with each of the Mem ber States' le gal sys tems and, from the point of view of those na tional systems, the norms of which are granted a per mis sion to op erate in do mes tic sys tems by na tional courts un der cer tain con di tions. As the dis cus sion in the next sec tion re veals, how ever, there is coun ter vail ing ev i dence indicating that this picture may be misleading, and that relations between legal systems in the EU are perhaps not all that they thus far seem.
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65 Nick Bar ber is an ex cep tion and has a more com plex read ing of the re la tions be tween le gal sys tems in the EU in Bar ber, "Le gal Plu ral ism and The Eu ro pean Union", n. above. See fur ther sec tion 4 note. 66 Here I am more or less ig nor ing the many is sues sur round ing the pres ent three pil lar struc ture of the EU, e. g. whether "the EU le gal sys tem" can be seen as one en tity, whether each of the pil lars should be seen as sub-sys tems of some overall EU le gal sys tem, with each of those pil lar-sub-sys tems hav ing a dif fer ent kind of re la tion ship with Mem ber States' le gal sys tems, or whether per haps only the EC legal or der is a le gal sys tem prop erly so called. There is im por tant work to be done in this area but space con straints mean that I can not at tempt this here. For some inter est ing thoughts on this is sue, see Herrmann, C. W., "Much Ado About Pluto? The 'Unity of the Le gal Or der of the Eu ro pean Un ion' Re vis ited", Eu ro pean Uni versity In sti tute Rob ert Schumann Cen tre for Ad vanced Stud ies, EUI Work ing Pa pers RSCAS 2007/05. See also note above for com ment on my use of the term "EU le gal sys tem" and "EC law" in the pres ent ar ti cle.
DIRECT EFFECT AND SUPREMACY: WHOSE NORMS ARE THEY ANYWAY?
Ac cord ing to the pic ture which seems to emerge from the dis cus sion so far, Mem ber States' le gal sys tems and the EU le gal sys tem are dis tinct le gal sys tems mak ing dis tinct suprem acy claims. On this un der stand ing, when those le gal sys tems come to in ter act -for ex am ple, when courts in Mem ber States come to ap ply EC law in a case be fore them per haps in op po si tion to do mes tic law on a topic-then what is hap pen ing is that the Mem ber State le gal sys tem in ques tion is grant ing a per mis sion to the norms of an other dis tinct sys tem, the EU le gal sys tem, to op er ate for now, in a cer tain way, and un der cer tain con di tions, in the do mestic le gal sys tem, and to have enforceability in do mes tic courts ac cord ingly. How ever, this pic ture is not with out its dif fi cul ties. We can start to work our way into some in terest ing puz zles in this re gard by ex am in ing fur ther the or igins and operation of the doctrines of the direct effect and supremacy of EC law.
As ev ery un der grad u ate stu dent of the sub ject knows, the di rect ef fect of EC law, that is to say, the di rect enforceability in Mem ber States' courts, by in di vid u als, of EC rights and re spon si bil i ties 67 was con clu sively es tablished by the ECJ in Van Gend en Loos, with the declaration that: "…ac cord ing to the spirit, the gen eral scheme and the word ing of the Treaty, Ar ti cle 12 must be in ter preted as pro duc ing di rect ef fects and cre at ing in di vid ual rights which na tional courts must pro tect,". 68 In dis cus sions of the le git i macy of this move by the ECJ, much can be made of the Court's re ly ing on the some what amor phous "spirit" and "gen eral scheme" of the Treaty in 31 HOW MANY LEGAL SYSTEMS? 67 In fact the def i ni tion of the doc trine is con tro ver sial, see e. g. Craig, P. and Burca, G. de, Eu ro pean Un ion Law, 3rd. ed., n. above, 178-182 and the lit er a ture re ferred to therein. How ever, I be lieve that the def i ni tion above will suf fice for the pur poses of the pres ent dis cus sion. 68 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1 at 13. jus ti fy ing its de ci sion. If we look closely, how ever, at the vision of the com mu nity that the ECJ ap par ently had in mind and/or was try ing to real ise in this judge ment, then a puz zle emerges as re gards the sta tus of di rectly effective EC norms:
The con clu sion to be drawn from this is that the Com mu nity con sti tutes a new le gal or der of in ter na tional law for the bene fit of which the states have lim ited their sov er eign rights, albeit within lim ited fields, and the sub jects of which com prise not only mem ber states but also their na tion als. In de pendently of the leg is la tion of mem ber states, com mu nity law there fore not only im poses ob li ga tions on in di vid u als but is also in tended to con fer upon them rights which be come part of their le gal her i tage. 69 In the pas sage the ECJ makes it clear what -in its view-in di vid u als in Mem ber States stand to gain from the EC (EEC as it then was), es pe cially if it is viewed as a commu nity ca pa ble of con fer ring on them di rectly ef fec tive EC rights, namely that they will be come the di rect bear ers of EC rights which "be come part of their le gal her i tage". This seems some what at odds with the pic ture emerg ing in previ ous sec tions of the EU le gal sys tem and Mem ber States' le gal sys tems as dis tinct sys tems and with the view that when EC norms are ap plied in do mes tic courts, this is, in ef fect, the do mes tic le gal sys tem grant ing a per mis sion to the norms of a "for eign" and dis tinct sys tem to op er ate domes ti cally un der cer tain con di tions. In the fa mous pas sage quoted above, in try ing to char ac ter ise things from the perspec tive of in di vid u als in Mem ber States' le gal sys tems, the ECJ does not seem to view EC norms as "for eign" norms that will be stow rights on those in di vid u als in their ca pac ity as such, but rather as norms which will be come in some sense "theirs" and not re main the norms of a for eign sys tem which hap pen to be en force able do mes ti cally. Given this view, it does not seem too much of a stretch to say that the ECJ could be ar gued in this pas sage to be view ing di rectly ef fec tive EC norms as be com ing part of the le gal her i tage of in di vid u als in Mem ber States in the sense of be com ing part of the le gal doc trine and in deed part of the le gal sys tems of those Mem ber States, and not merely as re main ing the norms of an other dis tinct sys tem which, un der cer tain condi tions, are en force able in do mes tic courts. To re turn to the short hand ter mi nol ogy coined in the in tro duc tion, on this in ter pre ta tion, the "Part of Member States' Legal Systems" model is the correct way to think about the relationship between EU law and national law.
This view seems to be con firmed even more clearly in some of the ECJs early state ments of the ra tio nale for the doc trine of the su prem acy of EC law over na tional law. In Costa v. ENEL, the Court jus ti fies its judge ment in part by reference to the dis tinc tive qual i ties of the en tity cre ated by the EEC Treaty: "By con trast with or di nary in ter national trea ties, the EEC treaty has cre ated its own le gal sys tem which, on the en try into force of the treaty, be came an in te gral part of the le gal sys tems of the mem ber states and which their courts are bound to ap ply". 70 Later in the judge ment, in dis cuss ing the di rect ef fect and su prem acy of the then Art. 37 of the EEC Treaty, the ECJ con tin ues:
Such a clearly ex pressed pro hi bi tion which came into force with the treaty through out the com mu nity, and so be came an in te gral part of the le gal sys tem of the mem ber states, forms part of the law of those states and di rectly con cerns their na tion als, in whose fa vour it cre ates in di vid ual rights which na tional courts must pro tect. 71 These state ments seem to in di cate that the ECJ does not view di rectly ef fec tive EC norms merely as the norms of a le gal sys tem dis tinct from Mem ber States' le gal sys tems but which is en force able in those na tional sys tems un der certain con di tions. Rather, it ap pears to view EC law as be ing in te grated into those sys tems, and as be com ing part of the law of Mem ber States' le gal sys tems. In deed, when these pas sages are read in the con text of the judge ment over all, it is clear that this vi sion of EC law not as "for eign law" ap plica ble in a do mes tic sys tem, but as in te grated into and part of Mem ber States' own le gal sys tems is, for the ECJ, part of the rea son why those na tional le gal sys tems can not ac cord pri macy to con flict ing "home-grown" norms. 72 The above ap proach is con firmed in other of the "clas sic" su prem acy judge ments as well:
…in so far as they [di rectly ef fec tive EC norms] are an in tegral part of, and take pre ce dence in, the le gal or der ap pli ca ble in the ter ri tory of each of the mem ber states -[those norms] also pre clude the valid adop tion of new na tional leg is la tive mea sures to the ex tent to which they would be in com pat i ble with com mu nity pro vi sions. 73 AND there are ech oes of it in other land mark judge ments of the ECJ in which the char ac ter of the EC it self is discussed in the course of jus ti fy ing the de ci sion in question:
It should be borne in mind at the out set that the EEC Treaty has cre ated its own le gal sys tem, which is in te grated into the le gal sys tems of the Mem ber States and which their courts are bound to ap ply. The sub jects of that le gal sys tem are not only the Mem ber States but also their na tion als. Just as it im poses bur dens on in di vid u als, Com mu nity law is also intended to give rise to rights which be come part of their le gal pat ri mony. 74 
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All of this seems to con firm the point that, at least accord ing to the ECJ, EC norms are, in terms of their re lation ship with Mem ber States' le gal sys tems, not merely the norms of a dis tinct sys tem which are ap pli ca ble in do mestic courts un der cer tain terms and con di tions. Rather, the ECJ views at least those EC norms ca pa ble of hav ing di rect ef fect in na tional courts and pri macy over na tional law as ac tu ally be com ing part of the le gal her i tage of Mem ber States' na tion als, and in deed as be com ing part of Mem ber States' le gal sys tems them selves. This in deed seems to shake up the pic ture which emerged from the dis cus sion in sections 2 and 3 of the EC le gal sys tem and Mem ber States' legal sys tems are dis tinct but in ter act ing le gal sys tems. However, el e ments of that pic ture, such as the claims to su prem acy made in re spect of the EC le gal sys tem by the ECJ, and in re spect of Mem ber States' le gal sys tems by national con sti tu tional courts still seem well sup ported by the ev i dence dis cussed above. Can we ac cept all of this together, or does some thing have to give? Do the claims to su prem acy by both the EC le gal sys tem and na tional le gal sys tems pull in one di rec tion -that of there be ing dis tinct sys tems with dis tinct sets of norms wherein some times the norms of one sys tem are given per mis sion to op er ate in another sys tem-but the state ments above by the ECJ re. the sta tus of di rectly ef fec tive EC norms as ac tu ally be com ing part of na tional law pull in an other? How ever we think about this, we seem now to have a more com plex pic ture emerg ing wherein di rectly ef fec tive EC norms are part of a dis tinct le gal sys tem, the EU le gal sys tem, but can also in some sense be seen as part of the le gal sys tems of Mem ber States and part of the do mes tic le gal her i tage of in di vid u als in Mem ber States. Are such norms part of a dis tinct EU legal sys tem, and part of Mem ber States' le gal sys tems at the same time? Whose norms are they any way?
One way for ward in this re gard might be not to rely so exclu sively on what the ECJ has said on the topic. For starters, it might be thought that there is a ten sion in the ECJ's 35 un der stand ing of the sit u a tion be cause, as was dis cussed in sec tion 2 above, on the one hand the Court in sists that EU law forms a dis tinct and in de pend ent le gal sys tem, but on the other hand, those state ments ex am ined above re veal that some times it seems to view EU law as ac tu ally part of Mem ber States law. 75 More over, the Court, of course, has its own rea sons for pre sent ing things in one way or an other at one point or an other, and per haps it is eas ier to persuade Mem ber States' courts to ap ply EC law and give it pre ce dence over con flict ing na tional law if you first of all pres ent that EC law to them as, in some sense, part of their own le gal her i tage, and part of their own le gal sys tems. The is sues un der dis cus sion in this sec tion re late to how we deter mine what are the lim its of le gal sys tems, and to whether there is a cor rect way to un der stand where one le gal sys tem leaves off and an other be gins. Con sid er able le gal the o ret i cal at ten tion has been given to such ques tions by Jo seph Raz both in his work on the na ture of le gal sys tems 76 and, more re cently, in work on the so-called in clu sive vs. ex clu sive legal pos i tiv ism de bate. 77 Some of the dis tinc tions and consid er ations which Raz dis cusses may be of use here in better fo cus sing these ques tions with regard to the re la tionship between the EU legal system and Member States legal systems.
In dis cuss ing the is sue of how we iden tify which norms be long to a given le gal sys tem, i.e. the cri te ria of mem bership of that sys tem, Raz takes the ap proach that the starting point in this re gard is that a le gal sys tem con sists of all those norms which its "pri mary norm-ap ply ing or gans" 78 
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-such as courts, tri bu nals, and other ju di cial bod ies-are un der a duty to ap ply. 79 How ever, he con tends that such a cri te rion needs to be mod i fied in or der to give a com plete an swer to the ques tion of which norms be long to a given legal sys tem be cause, amongst other things, 80 not all norms which the courts of a given le gal sys tem are un der an ob liga tion to ap ply thereby become part of the legal system in question:
Quite of ten the courts have an ob li ga tion to ap ply laws of other le gal sys tems, rules of pri vate as so ci a tions, and so on, al though these were not and do not be come part of the le gal sys tem. 81 US and UK stat utes give le gal ef fect to com pany reg u lations, to uni ver sity stat utes, and to many other stan dards with out thereby mak ing them part of the law of the United King dom or United States. Con flict-of-law doc trines give effect to for eign law with out mak ing it part of the law of the land. Such ref er ences make the ap pli ca tion of the stan dards re ferred to le gally re quired, and rights and du ties ac cord ing to law in clude there af ter rights and du ties de ter mined by those stan dards. But they do not make those stan dards part of the law. They no more be come part of the law of the land than do le gally bind ing con tracts, which are also bind ing accord ing to law and change peo ple's rights and du ties with out be ing them selves part of the law of the land. 82 In these pas sages, Raz is draw ing a dis tinc tion be tween norms which are bind ing ac cord ing to a given le gal sys tem and hence given le gal ef fect by the courts of that sys tem on 37 HOW MANY LEGAL SYSTEMS? 79 Raz dis cusses his rea sons for tak ing as his fo cus norm-ap ply ing in sti tu tions such as courts rather than norm-cre at ing in sti tu tions such as leg is la tures in Raz, The Con cept of a Le gal Sys tem, n. above, ch. VIII, es pe cially at 189-197; The Author ity of Law, n. above, ch. 5 es pe cially at 87-88. 80 Other com pli ca tions in cor rectly de ter min ing the iden tity of le gal sys tems are dis cussed by Raz in the works re ferred to in notes and above.the one hand, and norms which are ac tu ally part of the legal sys tem of a given ju ris dic tion on the other. This dis tinction can be used to il lu mi nate the ri val pic tures of the re lation ship be tween the EU le gal sys tem and Mem ber States' le gal sys tems con sid ered in this ar ti cle so far. If we ad here to the view which seemed to emerge from the dis cus sion in sec tions 2 and 3 above, i.e. that the le gal or der of the EU and Mem ber States' le gal or ders are dis tinct le gal sys tems wherein what hap pens when a court in a Mem ber State enforces an EU norm do mes ti cally is that the Mem ber State le gal sys tem grants a per mis sion to the norms of an other sys tem to op er ate within the na tional sys tem on cer tain con di tions, then, to put things in Razian terms, this seems to be a case of a le gal sys tem giv ing le gal ef fect to cer tain norms (in this case, EC norms) but with out those norms thereby be com ing part of the le gal sys tem in ques tion. On the other hand, if we take se ri ously the ECJ's view, discussed ear lier in the pres ent sec tion, that EC norms ca pable of pri macy and di rect ef fect ac tu ally be come in some sense part of the le gal her i tage of Mem ber State na tion als and in deed part of the law of those Mem ber States, then on this in ter pre ta tion of the re la tion ship be tween EC law and na tional law, EC norms over step the "bind ing ac cord ing to/given le gal ef fect by le gal sys tem X" side of the Razian dis tinc tion and ac tu ally be come part of Member States' legal systems.
But which in ter pre ta tion should we adopt? One tempt ing av e nue in this re gard might be to ex am ine the terms of mea sures which gov ern the re la tion ship be tween EC law and na tional law in na tional courts, for ex am ple, in the case of the United King dom, the Eu ro pean Com mu ni ties Act 1972. As was noted in the dis cus sion in sec tion 3 however, the Eng lish courts have var ied in their un der stand ing of what that stat ute re quires of them over time, 83 and the terms of it are not en tirely per spic u ous on the mat ter of whether EC law is to be re garded as part of Eng lish law or 38 merely bind ing ac cord ing to and hence to be given le gal effect by it. 84 Section 2(1) of the Act tells us that:
All such rights, pow ers, li a bil i ties, ob li ga tions and re strictions from time to time cre ated or aris ing by or un der the Trea ties, and all such rem e dies and pro ce dures from time to time pro vided for by or un der the Trea ties, as in ac cor dance with the Trea ties are with out fur ther en act ment to be given le gal ef fect or used in the United King dom shall be re cognised and avail able in law, and be en forced, al lowed and followed ac cord ingly; and the ex pres sion "en force able Com munity right" and sim i lar ex pres sions shall be read as re fer ring to one to which this sub sec tion ap plies. 85 But this does not seem par tic u larly help ful as re gards whether we should re gards such do mes ti cally en force able Com mu nity norms as merely be ing given le gal ef fect by the le gal sys tems in the UK, or rather as ac tu ally be com ing part of those sys tems. Even if we were minded to of fer a close read ing of this pro vi sion, it would seem we can find ev i dence sup port ing each of these views, e. g. the "to be given le gal ef fect" for mu la tion sounds closer to the idea of EC norms as the norms of a dis tinct sys tem merely be ing bind ing ac cord ing to do mes tic law, but the "shall be re cognised and avail able in law" part seem ing to sup port an inter pre ta tion to the ef fect that those norms ac tu ally be come part of that do mes tic law.
The ev i dence from the UK in cor po rat ing mea sure hence seems some what in con clu sive. More over, if we go down this route, then it may turn out that there are as many in ter preta tions of whether EC norms are merely given le gal ef fect by, or rather be come part of, Mem ber States' le gal sys tems as there are dif fer ent ap proaches to that ques tion in Member States' na tional con sti tu tional law and in their re spec -tive in cor po rat ing mea sures, if in deed their con sti tu tional or der re quires such mea sures. This, of course, is one of the fac tors mo ti vat ing the ECJ to try to set tle is sues such as the pri macy and di rect ef fect of EC law cen trally, and to claim that such doc trines do not rest on their ac cep tance by or in cor po ra tion into Mem ber States' na tional law, but rather stem from the na ture and pur pose of the EC it self. 86 Given that this is so, even if we can iden tify a co her ent view in the rel e vant in cor po rat ing mea sure or in cor po rat ing prac tice re. whether EC norms are merely given le gal ef fect by or rather be come part of na tional law, why should we priv i lege the point of view of the Member States' legal systems on this issue rather than the view of the ECJ?
Raz him self is sus pi cious of the idea that this is sue can be set tled purely by look ing to the tech ni cal means of in corpo ra tion or the lan guage of the in cor po rat ing mea sure. 87 Rather, he claims, "…it de pends in part on our gen eral concep tion of what a le gal sys tem is and how it re lates to norma tive stan dards out side it, such as for eign law, moral consid er ations, or the con sti tu tion and laws of nonstate or gani sa tions". 88 What sort of fac tors does he view as rel e vant in this regard? In ear lier work on this topic, Raz puts the mat ter as fol lows:
The rea sons for en forc ing the norm, and the at ti tude of the courts and the leg is la ture to its en force ment, are the cru cial fac tors…Ul ti mately the prob lem turns on an ac cu mu la tion of ev i dence jus ti fy ing a judge ment whether a norm is en forced on the grounds that it is part of the law's func tion to sup port other so cial sys tems or be cause it is part of the law it self. 89 
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And in the more re cent, 'In cor po ra tion by Law', he explains the im por tance of the dis tinc tion be tween norms given le gal ef fect to by a given le gal sys tem and norms which are part of that le gal sys tem as follows: …so long as the law main tains its place at the heart of the po lit i cal or ga ni za tion of so ci ety and re mains a fo cus of at titudes of iden ti fi ca tion and alien ation, the dis tinc tion has an im por tance way be yond any le gal tech ni cal i ties. 90 It [the law] is a po lit i cal in sti tu tion of great im por tance to the work ing of so ci et ies and to their mem bers. From this point of view a Brit ish per son can not say "Pol ish law is my law" just be cause it will be fol lowed by Brit ish courts when their con flict-of-law rules di rect them to do so. The dis tinction be tween stan dards that the courts have to ap ply and those that are the law of the land is vi tal to our abil ity to iden tify the law as the po lit i cal in sti tu tion that it is. 91 All of this sug gests some in trigu ing pos si ble ways for ward as re gards ex am in ing whether EC norms should be viewed as the norms of a dis tinct sys tem of law which are merely given le gal ef fect, for now, and un der cer tain con di tions, in Mem ber States' le gal sys tems, or whether those norms have be come part of the law of Mem ber States' le gal sys tems. If Raz is cor rect about the dis tinc tion he draws and the reasons for draw ing it, 92 then in or der to in ves ti gate this is sue more fully, we will need to in quire into, amongst other things, the rea sons why Mem ber States' courts do en force and grant pri macy to EC law, and the at ti tudes, in clud ing at ti tudes of iden ti fi ca tion with and/or alien ation from EC law, on the part of those courts, and of EU cit i zens. Do Eng lish courts ap ply and en force EC law be cause of some 41 HOW MANY LEGAL SYSTEMS? 90 Raz, "In cor po ra tion by Law", n. above, 12. 91 Ibi dem, 15. 92 See note above for the use made of the views of other le gal the o rists in this ar ti cle, and see the same note, and sec tion 1 above, for the aims of the dis cus sion over all. be lief that it is valu able to sup port and give ef fect to the norms of a nor ma tive sys tem dis tinct from their do mes tic le gal sys tem or are they en forc ing it as "their own" law, perhaps mo ti vated by a sense of iden ti fi ca tion with char ac ter and pur poses of the pol ity that is the EU and of which they are a con stit u ent part? 93 Do Mem ber States' na tion als/EU cit i zens, in con sid er ing and/or seek ing to rely on EC law in na tional courts think, "EU law is my law"? 94 One ob vi ous an swer would be that it de pends on who you ask and it depends which area of EU law you mean, but what is use ful in con sid er ing the above is sues is that they may point the way to wards some of the ques tions that it would be worth ask ing, and of whom it would be worth ask ing them, if we are to gain a more nuanced view of the lim its of and re lations be tween le gal sys tems in the EU. We could also ask some of these ques tions not merely of Mem ber States' courts and na tion als but also of the ECJ it self. Is it mere rhet o ric when the ECJ re fers to EC norms ca pa ble of suprem acy and di rect ef fect as al ready "part of" the law of Mem ber States, or does the Court re ally view such a sta tus as con trib ut ing to the rea sons for the doc trine of pri macy? Would it rep re sent the ab ne ga tion of the dis tinc tive ness of the EC as a "new le gal or der" 95 to view EC law as fully part 42 JULIE DICKSON 93 In con sid er ing these is sues it would be nec es sary to re visit the "stan dard" un der stand ing of na tional courts as en forc ing EU law, but only on the say so, and un der the terms spec i fied by, the na tional le gal sys tem, dis cussed in sec tion 3 above. Per haps at ti tudes to wards EU law and rea sons for en forc ing it on the part of na tional courts are more var ied and com plex than the dis cus sion in sec tion 3 in dicated. 94 Will the an swer be dif fer ent de pend ing on whether they are asked the question qua Mem ber State na tional or qua EU cit i zen? Is it even sen si ble to draw such a dis tinc tion when a point of EU law is at is sue? From the point of view of the EU itself, the very cre ation of EU cit i zen ship and the de vel op ment of its sta tus ar gu ably has as one of its aims the en cour age ment of just this "EU law is my law" way of think ing. In my view, this is an av e nue clearly wor thy of fu ture in ves ti ga tion as regards the is sue of the sta tus of EC norms in na tional le gal sys tems. For dis cus sion of some re cent de vel op ments which might be rel e vant to such an in ves ti ga tion, see S. Wernicke, " of Mem ber States' le gal sys tems rather than as a le gal system dis tinct from them whose norms are granted a per mission to op er ate do mes ti cally? Or would it per haps be the ulti mate in di ca tion of the flour ish ing of the EU le gal or der and of its suc cess ful in te gra tion into Mem ber States' le gal sys tems to view it as fully part of their law rather than as a le gal sys tem dis tinct from them but bind ing ac cord ing to them? Of course, as was briefly men tioned ear lier in this sec tion, per haps the "rather than" is out of place here, and it is pos si ble that EC norms en force able in na tional courts are part of a dis tinct EU le gal sys tem and part of Mem ber States' le gal sys tems at the same time. If this is the case, then the sim ple pic ture of there be ing as many dis tinct legal sys tems in the EU as there are mem ber states' le gal sys tems plus one, the EU le gal sys tem which has a sep arate re la tion ship with each of the le gal sys tems of the Member States again seems to break down some what, be cause when we come to ex am ine which norms be long to which sys tem, we will find con sid er able over lap in con tent between the EU le gal sys tem and Mem ber States' le gal systems sim ply in vir tue of EU norms be ing ap plied by national courts. On this view, when a na tional court ap plies an EC norm do mes ti cally, it thereby ren ders that EC norm part of the Mem ber State le gal sys tem as well as part of the EU le gal sys tem, and hence in creases the over lap be tween the do mes tic sys tem and the EU le gal sys tem. 96 Things are com pli cated even fur ther in terms of con sid ering which norms be long to which le gal sys tem -Mem ber State or EU-if we adopt Raz's method of un der stand ing the cri te ria of le gal sys tem mem ber ship in terms of those norms which the le gal sys tem's pri mary norm-ap ply ing organs -such as courts, tri bu nals and other ju di cial bod iesare ob li gated to ap ply. If we ap ply such a view to the EU le -gal sys tem it self, fur ther com plex i ties about which norms be long to which sys tem emerge be cause for the pur poses of much of the ap pli ca tion of EU law, the rel e vant courts are ac tu ally the do mes tic courts of Mem ber States' le gal systems. Al though the ECJ claims to re tain an in ter pre tive monop oly as re gards the mean ing and ap pli ca tion of EC law, 97 and al though there are ac tions in EU law which take place spe cif i cally in the ECJ or Court of First In stance, 98 it is, famously, na tional courts who do the lion's share of the appli ca tion and en force ment of EC law given the terms of oper a tion of the EC Treaty Art. 234 pre lim i nary ref er ence pro ce dure, and the cre ation by the ECJ of doc trines such as the di rect ef fect and su prem acy of EC law 99 and the prin ci ple of Mem ber State li a bil ity. This seems to in di cate that, when a point of EC law is in play and must be ap plied by na tional courts, that those na tional courts are in ef fect act ing as EC courts, and as part of the EC le gal sys tem. 100 Given this level of over lap as re gards sys tem norms and indeed sys tem in sti tu tions, we may be gin to won der whether it is sen si ble even to con tinue to ask ques tions re gard ing which norms be long to which sys tem -Mem ber State or EU-al though once again, the points men tioned above 44 raised by Raz's work on the na ture and lim its of le gal systems sug gest that in ter est ing ques tions re main in this regard, which can be solved only by fo cus sing on var i ous of the at ti tudes to these sys tems in terms of their role as part of units of political identification and/or alienation held by, amongst others, Member States' courts and Member States nationals/EU citizens.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE ISSUES: FURTHER COMPLEXITIES AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU LEGAL SYSTEM AND MEMBER STATES LEGAL SYSTEMS
In fol low ing the fore go ing dis cus sion the reader may well feel more frus tra tion than en light en ment for it may feel as if I have raised many ques tions and pro vided an swers to few of them. What I have tried to do is to con sider some of the ev i dence for the "27 plus 1" model, i.e. for re gard ing the EU le gal sys tem and Mem ber States' le gal sys tems as dis tinct but in ter act ing sys tems wherein the ap pli ca tion of EC norms in na tional courts amounts to the na tional sys tem in ques tion grant ing the norms of a dis tinct sys tem per mission to op er ate do mes ti cally un der cer tain con di tions. Having es tab lished the prima fa cie plau si bil ity of this pic ture, I sought to in tro duce some fur ther con sid er ations which under mine and com pli cate it, such as the pos si bil ity that EC norms which are di rectly en force able in na tional courts are best in ter preted as ac tu ally be com ing part of the na tional le gal sys tem in ques tion, and hence that the "Part of Member States' Le gal Sys tems" model is the cor rect one. With these ten sions on the ta ble, I then con sid ered some work on the na ture of le gal sys tems from gen eral ju ris pru dence which may point the way to some fur ther in ves ti ga tions capa ble of re solv ing or at least shed ding fur ther light on these ten sions. It is true that in all of this I have not staked my claim to a con clu sive po si tion on the mat ter of the char acter of and re la tions be tween le gal sys tems in the EU, but as 45 I stated at the out set, my aim in the pres ent dis cus sion is rather to pro vide a better and more fo cussed un der stand ing of the relevant questions and puzzles as regards this issue by examining them in light of some legal philosophical considerations.
Even in the course of at tempt ing to fo cus the rel e vant issues, more such puz zles re veal them selves. The dis cus sion in sec tion 4 above fo cuses pri mar ily on some puz zles gen erated by the sta tus of di rectly ef fec tive EC law ca pa ble of directly sub sti tut ing it self for con flict ing na tional law in a man ner which may jus tify in ter pret ing it as ac tu ally be coming part of the law of the Mem ber State le gal sys tem in ques tion. How ever, not all EC mea sures are ca pa ble of such ef fects, per haps most fa mously, EC di rec tives are not ca pable of them in so-called "hor i zon tal" sit u a tions, that is, when be ing en forced against, and hence im pos ing ob li gations on, in di vid u als rather than on em a na tions of the state in the Mem ber State in ques tion. 101 It has been sug gested to me 102 that per haps one rea son 103 why EC di rec tives cannot be en forced in na tional courts in "hor i zon tal" sit u a tions is that they are best in ter preted as the norms of an other legal sys tem dis tinct from that of the Mem ber State sys tem in ques tion and that, in the ab sence of na tional im ple ment ing mea sures en vis aged to trans late them into na tional law 104 they re main thus, and hence un en force able in na tional courts. 105 One in trigu ing pos si bil ity gen er ated if we adopt 46 
